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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE

Petitioner German Popoca-Garcia (hereinafter "Mr. Popoca") appeals
from the district court's order denying his petition seeking post-conviction
relief following an evidentiary hearing. This appeal presents the question
of whether trial counsel's performance in advising Mr. Popoca during plea
negotiations - specifically, the clarity of his explanation of the immigration
consequences of entering a guilty plea - met an objective standard of
reasonableness. Under the standards articulated in Padilla v. Kentucky, Mr.
Popoca's trial counsel is required to give him clear, specific, affirmative and
correct legal advice as to the presumptive immigration consequences of a
guilty plea where those consequences are clear. Mr. Popoca, a non-citizen,
pleaded guilty to the felony offense of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child
Under Sixteen, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-1508, which is clearly an
" aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(hereinafter "INA"), and therefore made his deportation a virtual certainty.
There is no dispute as to the clarity of the consequences-the dispute
pertains instead to the clarity with which trial counsel actually conveyed
those consequences to Mr. Popoca.
1

Because trial counsel did not clearly communicate the legal
consequence to Mr. Popoca, he was unable to make an informed decision
about knowingly and voluntarily entering a guilty plea. Further, trial
counsel's performance was deficient because it would have been rational
under the circumstances for Mr. Popoca to reject the plea bargait;l had he
known that admitting guilt to Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under
Sixteen would have virtually guaranteed his deportation. For these
reasons, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Popoca's request for
post-conviction relief.
STATEMENT OFTHE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Mr. Popoca is a citizen of Mexico and held the status of Lawful
Permanent Resident of the United States since he was ten years old. (R., p.
4.) On June 18, 2010, Mr. Popoca was charged in the Sixth Judicial District
Court in Bingham County with the offense of Lewd Conduct with a Minor
Child Under Sixteen, pursuant to I.C. § 18-1508 (R., pp. 88-89). On the
advice of his attorney, Manuel Murdoch, Mr. Popoca pleaded guilty to the
charged offense on September 17, 2010. (R., p. 89.)

2

The Change of Plea Hearing
At the change of plea hearing the court put Mr. Popoca under oath
and asked him a series of questions about (among other things) the nature
of the charged offense, the potential penalty that could result from a guilty
plea, and his right as a defendant to seek a jury trial. (Tr., pp. 5-10.)
During this colloquy, the court advised Mr. Popoca that, pursuant to the
plea agreement, he would be required to undergo a psychosexual
evaluation. (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 4-6.) The court then announced that Mr. Popoca
understood the nature of the offense and the consequence of pleading
guilty, and found that he entered the guilty plea knowingly and
voluntarily. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 22-25 - p.ll, Ls. 1-3.)
After the court accepted his guilty plea, Mr. Murdoch informed the
court that "My client will most likely have some immigration consequences
to this [the guilty plea]. And I've informed him of this, that this could put
his permanent resident status in jeopardy, a plea to this charge, and he's
understood that." (Tr., p. II, Ls. 7-11.) (emphasis added). Under the INA,
this state criminal conviction is an "aggravated felony" that mandates
deportation. 8 U.s.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). The Court then asked Mr. Popoca,

3

"Sir, you do understand that? That you could be deported because of this
crime?" (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 12-13.) Mr. Popoca replied, "Yes." (Tr., p. 11, L. 14.)
The Sentencing Hearing
At the sentencing hearing on December 17,2010, Mr. Murdoch
requested probation for Mr. Popoca. (Tr., pp. 16-20.) After Mr. Murdoch
made his case for probation, deputy prosecutor Randy Smith stated, "My
office has been contacted by ICEI [Immigration and Customs Enforcement].
Once this case is adjudicated - and they would ask that the judgment is
clear as to the ages of the victim and Mr. Popoca-Garcia at the time - is that
he will be placed into deportation proceedings." (Tr., p. 20, Ls. 21-25 - p. 21,
L. 1.) (emphasis added). Mr. Murdoch responded," As far as the

immigration issue goes, Mr. Smith said he is going to be deported. It's
premature to say that. We don't know. That's going to have to run through

whatever proceedings immigration courts do. I do a lot of immigration law.
And I can say it's unclear at this point whether this would actually result in a
removal or not." (Tr., p. 24, L. 25 - p. 25, Ls. 1-6.) (emphasis added).

The U.s. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is the investigative arm of the
Department of Homeland Security. See, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last
visited 10/03/2013).

1
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The district court sentenced Mr. Popoca to a period of incarceration
of two years fixed, eight years indeterminate. (Tr., p. 28, Ls. 16-17.) On
May 4,2011, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and ordered Mr.
Popoca to serve his period of incarceration. (R., p. 89.) Mr. Popoca did not
appeal his conviction or sentence. Id.
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
On January 27, 2012, Mr. Popoca filed this Petition for PostConviction Relief with the district court. (R., pp. 4-11.) In this Petition, Mr.
Popoca averred that Mr. Murdoch did not tell him that his conviction for
Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under Sixteen was an aggravated
felony under the INA that made his deportation a virtual certainty. (R., pp.
6-7.) Mr. Popoca also averred that Mr. Murdoch did not inform him that a
conviction for an aggravated felony legally required the loss of his Lawful
Permanent Resident status and his detention pending the resolution of
deportation proceedings. (R., pp. 6-7.) Mr. Popoca further avers that but
for the erroneous advice, he would have exercised his right to a jury trial
and otherwise tried to mitigate the adverse immigration consequences of
any conviction. (R., p. 8.)

5

Without an answer from the State, the district court issued a Notice of
Intent to Dismiss the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on March 5, 2012,
reflecting the court's inclination to dismiss the case on the basis that the
Petitioner was aware that his plea could cause his deportation. (R., pp. 1318.) Mr. Popoca filed a Response to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss on
March 27,2012, arguing (among other things) that defense counsel was
obligated to tell Mr. Popoca that if he pleaded guilty to the charged offense
that his deportation was virtually certain. (R., pp. 19-28.) The State filed its
Answer to the Petition on August 7,2012. (R., pp. 29-31.) The district court
then set the matter for an evidentiary hearing on November 30, 2012 to
resolve the question of whether or not Mr. Murdoch met his duty under

Padilla by clearly informing Mr. Popoca that a guilty plea to the charged
offense would result in deportation rather than that such a plea could result
in deportation. (R., pp. 32-33; p. 91.)

The Evidentiary Hearing
Two witnesses testified at the evidentiary hearing: Mr. Murdoch and
Mr. Popoca's step-father, Adolfo Arroyo. (Tr., pp. 33-61, 63-67.) The

6

district court decision did not make any specific factual findings. 2 (R., pp.
88-95.) The district court did not make any overt credibility
determinations. Id.
Testimony of Manuel Murdoch at the Evidentiary Hearing
Mr. Murdoch testified that he had concluded that a guilty plea would
result in an aggravated felony conviction and a loss of permanent resident
status. (Tr., p. 36, Ls. 20-25; p. 53, Ls. 21-25 - p. 54, L. 1.) For his part, Mr.
Murdoch swears that he informed Mr. Popoca of that consequence. (Tr., p.
37, Ls. 4-6; p. 48, Ls. 16-20; p. 54, Ls. 6-10.) However, Mr. Murdoch also
testified that he informed Mr. Popoca that deportation was only a
possibility, telling him that ICE" could" and" most likely would" deport
Mr. Popoca as a result of the conviction. (Compare Tr., p. 36, Ls. 20-25 with
Tr., p. 37, Ls. 20-21.) Additionally, Mr. Murdoch testified that he informed

As explained in the Standard of Review section of this brief, the Petitioner assumes as
true those facts that are not directly refuted and may support the district court's
ultimate conclusion that U[b]y the time of sentencing, Popoca-Garcia had already
knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty with an understanding that he would be
deported." Petitioner submits that the conclusion of the district could have been based
upon any combination of factual findings. As argued, infra, the failure to make specific
factual findings materially affects this Court's ability to adequately review the questions
presented by this appeal as the acceptance or rejection of certain facts directly instruct
whether Mr. Murdoch provided constitutionally effective counseL The Petitioner,
however, did not object to the lack of factual findings below.
2
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Mr. Popoca that ICE officials believed that they could not deport him based
on such a conviction. (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 11-23; p. 48, Ls. 21-23; p. 54, Ls. 18-20.)
Mr. Murdoch then testified that Mr. Popoca did appear to him to be
intellectually slow, and that he took extra time to explain the sentencing
arrangement to him. (Tr., p. 54, Ls. 23-25 - p. 55, Ls. 1-5, 10-14.) The
psychosexual evaluation that occurred after the change of plea hearing
affirmed Mr. Popoca's low intellectual functioning. (Tr., p,,;55, Ls. 6-9.)
Nonetheless, Mr. Murdoch stated that he did not recall any response or
reaction on the part of Mr. Popoca after explaining to him that the guilty
plea would subject him to mandatory deportation. (Tr., p. 44, Ls. 2-16; p.
50, Ls. 4-14.)
While Mr. Murdoch doesn't doubt that he spoke to Mr. Popoca's
parents at some point during the course of Mr. Popoca's case, he also
testified that he did not recall informing them that he remained unsure
about the immigration consequences of the conviction. (Tr., p. 55, Ls. 1623.)
Finally, Mr. Murdoch testified that because ICE's position was that
they could not deport Mr. Popoca based on such a conviction, he argued
for probation at sentencing and again represented to the court that Mr.
tl

Popoca's deportation was not automatic but a possibility. (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 2125 - p. 40, Ls. 1-10.) Mr. Murdoch subsequently acknowledged that while
ICE field agents have the power to arrest and detain individuals, they do
not appear in immigration court to bring the charge and argue for
deportation. (Tr., p. 56, Ls. 24-25 - p. 57, Ls. 1-25 - p. 58, Ls. 1-22.)
Testimony of Adolfo Arroyo at the Evidentiary Hearing
The only other witness at the evidentiary hearing was Mr. Popoca's
step-father, Adolfo Arroyo. The district decision states that Mr. Arroyo
testified that he spoke with Mr. Murdoch after the sentencing hearing to
ask how Mr. Popoca's criminal case would affect his immigration status.
(R., p. 94.) Mr. Arroyo actually testified that he had conversations with Mr.
Murdoch before one court hearing and after another. (Tr., p. 65, Ls. 9-15.)
Mr. Arroyo testified that Mr. Murdoch did not fully answer his questions
and that Mr. Murdoch's answer was "I don't know until immigration
decides." (Tr., p. 65, 1. 24.) The court did not evaluate whether Mr. Arroyo
was credible or the weight given to his testimony other than to say that Mr.
Popoca was not present at the time. (R., p. 94.)
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Issues briefed by the parties after the Evidentiary Hearing
In the parties' written briefs for closing argument, both Mr. Popoca
and the State agreed that the immigration consequences of the conviction
were clear and that Mr. Murdoch had a duty to provide clear and correct
advice. (R., pp. 53-54,65-66.) The State argued that Mr. Murdoch did
inform Mr. Popoca that a conviction would result in deportation, and that
Mr. Murdoch's advice was not qualified by advising his client of the
allegedly erroneous opinion conveyed by ICE officials. (R., pp. 53-54.) Mr.
Popoca argued that Mr. Murdoch's performance was deficient for failure to
clearly and accurately inform him of the obvious immigration
consequences of pleading guilty because: (1) Mr. Murdoch's advice was, at
best, contradictory, and at worst, completely wrong; (2) Mr. Murdoch
relied, in part, on hearsay statements about the apparent deportation
intentions of ICE even though he admitted that ICE was not the
prosecuting agency in deportation actions; and (3) Mr. Murdoch's
contradictory statements and implicit suggestion that Mr. Popoca might
not be deported rendered any correct advice once given, deficient, denying
Mr. Popoca a fully understanding of the range of consequences of his
guilty plea. (R., pp. 77-81.)
1U

The District Court decision
On January 17, 2013, the district court issued a written decision
denying Mr. Popoca's request for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 88-95.)
First, the court found that the immigration consequences of the conviction
were truly clear, and that Mr. Murdoch had a duty to give correct advice.
(R., p. 92.) The court noted that correct advice required more than just
informing Mr. Popoca that he might be deported; it required informing
him that he would be deported. (R., p. 92.) To this end, the court
determined that the plea colloquy, standing alone, did not suffice to show
that Mr. Popoca understood that deportation was virtually certain to occur
as a result of his plea, which in turn prompted the evidentiary hearing. (R.,

p.93.)
After evaluating the testimony that emerged from the evidentiary
hearing, the court found that Mr. Popoca failed to marshal sufficient
evidence, pursuant to the first prong of Strickland v. Washington, to show
that Mr. Murdoch failed to fulfill defense counsel's obligation under
Padilla. (R., p. 95.) The court concluded that Mr. Murdoch did, in fact,

make a direct representation to Mr. Popoca that the charged offense would
have adverse immigration consequences, and that this representation met
11

an objective standard of reasonableness. (R., p. 95.) While the court's
decision did not include specific factual findings, the Petitioner did not
object to the lack of factual findings, and subsequently filed this appeal.
(R., pp. 88-95, 99-101.)
Because deportation proceedings do not stop during either the
criminal appeals process or the post-conviction relief process, an
immigration judge ordered Mr. Popoca's deportation on December 3,
2012.3 The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal of that
order on April 11, 2013.4 Mr. Popoca has since been deported to Mexico.
ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether Mr. Murdoch's statements to Mr. Popoca about the
immigration consequences of his guilty to plea were legally sufficient
to meet the standard of Padilla v.Kentucky.
2. Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Murdoch provided legally sufficient
advice to Mr. Popoca under Padilla v. Kentucky, whether that advice
was nullified by Mr. Murdoch's suggestion to Mr. Popoca might not
be deported in fact.

This Board decision and Mr. Popoca's subsequent physical removal occurred after the
proceedings below concluded a motion to augment the record will be filed.
4 Id.
3
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Mr. Popoca seeks post-conviction relief to withdraw a guilty plea that
he alleges was unknowing and involuntary because his prior defense
attorney, Mr. Murdoch, failed to correctly advise him about the
immigration consequences of his plea. (R., pp. 4-10.)

1/

A claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the postconviction procedure act." Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App.
2002). In this civil proceeding, Mr. Popoca bears the burden of establishing
that he is entitled to post-conviction relief by a preponderance of the
evidence. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233 (Ct. App. 1994).
In a post-conviction petition based on a claim that trial counsel failed
to advise or misadvised the Petitioner about the immigration consequences
of a criminal conviction, Strickland applies. Padilla v. Kentucky, _ U.S. _ ,
130 S.Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
presents a mixed question of law and fact. Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617
(2011). When faced with mixed questions of law and fact, an appellate
court will defer to the factual findings made by lower courts if those
determinations are based upon substantial evidence, but freely reviews the

13

application of the relevant law to those facts. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho
918,921-22 (Ct. App. 1992).
Upon review of a district court's denial of a petition for postconviction relief when an evidentiary hearing has occurred, Idaho
appellate courts will not disturb the district court's factual findings unless
they are clearly erroneous. LR.C.P. 52(a); Booth, 151 Idaho at 617; McKinney

v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700 (1999); Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 (Ct. App.
1994). A finding of fact will not be deemed clearly erroneous if it is
supported by substantial, even if conflicting, evidence in the
record. Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312 (1983). However, if there are no
specific findings of fact, an appellate court should only disregard the
absence of findings of fact if the record is clear and presents an obvious
answer to the question on appeal. Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho
217,225 (1982). While the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be
given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence
are all matters solely within the province of a district court, Bradley v. State,
151 Idaho 629, 631 (Ct. App. 2011), the legal conclusions of a district court
drawn from its factual findings are freely reviewed by an appellate court.

Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52 (Ct. App. 1988).
14

As a mixed question of law and fact, this Court must assess whether
the facts of Mr. Murdoch's representation meet the legal standard of
constitutionally effective counsel under Padilla and Strickland. The district
court decision did not include specific factual findings. See I.C. § 19-4907(a)
(requiring court to make specific factual findings on each issue after an
evidentiary hearing). Nonetheless, the decision concludes that "[b]y the
time of sentencing, Mr. Popoca-Garcia had already knowingly and
voluntarily pled guilty with an understanding that he would be deported."
(R., pp. 94-95;) The decision recites a variety of facts, some of which are
essential to the court's legal conclusion, and others that are not essential
but may have been found by the court. The Petitioner submits that the
essential facts include the fact that Mr. Murdoch knew that Mr. Popoca was
a Lawful Permanent Resident, and that he told Mr. Popoca that deportation
would be a consequence of a guilty plea. See R., pp. 94-95. However, the
decision also includes facts of Mr. Murdoch's representations to the court
at the change of plea and sentencing hearings and his communications
with Mr. Popoca about whether immigration authorities would actually
deport him. See generally, R. pp. 88-95.

15

The district court decision also did not address the credibility of the
two testifying witnesses. To reach its conclusion, the district court must
have found Mr. Murdoch a credible witness, and for this reason,
Petitioner's argument begins from an assumption that the district court
found Mr. Murdoch credible.
In the context of alleged deficiencies of counsel relating to guilty
pleas, the specific standard for prejudice is whether "there is a reasonably
probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley v. State,
148 Idaho 671,676 (2009). "[T]he focus is 'on the defendant's state of mind
when choosing to plead guilty,' and there is no requirement that the Court
speculate as to the potential sentence for a lesser charged offense should
the jury convict on that basis at retrial." Booth, 151 Idaho at 622 (quoting
McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 853 (2004)).

LEGAL ARGUMENT
1.

Introduction.
On December 3,2012, Mr. Popoca was stripped of his status as a

Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States and ordered deported for
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having entered a guilty plea on advice of his trial counsel, Mr. Murdoch5,
to an offense that qualifies as an aggravated felony" under the INA. The
1/

result should have surprised nobody. It should not have surprised Mr.
Murdoch, who testified that he did a lot of immigration law," and it
1/

should not have surprised Mr. Popoca because as a non-citizen defendant
in criminal proceedings, he is guaranteed effective counsel, which includes
the unequivocal advice that he would be deported if he plead guilty to Lewd
Conduct with a Minor Under Sixteen, I.e. § 18-1508. (Tr., p. 34, Ls. 16-19;
p. 36, Ls. 14-15.) Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478, 1483.

There is no dispute that Mr. Popoca was a Lawful Permanent
Resident of the United States and that the entry of his guilty plea to Lewd
Conduct with a Minor under Sixteen would subject him to automatic
deportation. (R., pp. 53, 65-66, 92.) There is no dispute that this
consequence to Mr. Popoca was patently clear, entitling him to clear,
correct advice that as a consequence of his plea, his deportation was
presumptively automatic. (R., pp. 53, 65-66, 92.) There is also no dispute
that trial counsel talked to Mr. Popoca about the immigration consequences

This final order and Mr. Popoca's subsequent physical removal occurred after the
proceedings below concluded a motion to augment the record will be filed.

5
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of his guilty plea on more than one occasion, including before the entry of
his guilty plea. (R., pp. 53-55, 75-81,92-94.) The district court and both
parties agreed that Mr. Murdoch was required to inform Mr. Popoca that
deportation was a virtual certainty, automatic or otherwise unavoidable.
(R., p. 92.) ("In this case, as in Padilla, the immigration consequences are
truly clear and defense counsel had a duty to give correct advice. That
advice had to be more than Mr. Popoca-Garcia might be deported. It had to
be that he would be deported.") (emphasis added). See also R., pp. 53-54
(State's brief noting that the correct advice is that Mr. Popoca would be
deported if found guilty) (emphasis added). The focus of this petition is
the accuracy and clarity of trial counsel's advice.
Trial counsel told Mr. Popoca, variously, that he would be deported, that
he might be deported, that he was likely to be deported, and suggested that he

might not be deported at all by the immigration authorities who erroneously
believed that the charged offense did not require that he be deported. (Tr.,
p. 37, Ls. 4-23; p. 48, Ls. 16-23.) Even if this Court were to find that trial
counsel clearly provided Mr. Popoca the correct advice at some time, the
advice was nullified by trial counsel's suggestion that Mr. Popoca might
escape deportation because of an error on behalf of the immigration
18

authorities. (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 4-23; p. 48, Ls. 16-23.) Twice, trial counsel
represented to the district court that deportation was only a possibility, and
that he told his client as much. (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 6-11 (change of plea); p. 24,
Ls. 25 - p. 25, Ls. 1-6. (sentencing)) One representation was made to the
court before Mr. Popoca entered his plea, the other before the court
pronounced the sentence. Id.
Because trial counsel failed to satisfy his duty to clearly and
unequivocally inform Mr. Popoca that federal law required his
deportation, Mr. Popoca demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
that trial counsel was ineffective. For these reasons, the district court erred
when it dismissed Mr. Popoca's petition for post-conviction relief.
II.

Mr. Murdoch failed to unequivocally communicate to Mr.
Popoca that he would be deported.

Mr. Popoca's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel within a
post-conviction petition is measured by the standards articulated by the

u.s. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s. 668 (1984).

See,

e.g., State v. Yokovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2007). In March of 2010, the u.s.

Supreme Court ruled that constitutionally effective counsel requires
defense counsel to affirmatively inform a non-citizen defendant of the
19

immigration consequences of a plea agreement. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1478,

1483. See also United States v. Bonilla, 637 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 2011) (itA
criminal defendant who faces almost certain deportation is entitled to
know more than that it is possible that a guilty plea could lead to removal;
he is entitled to know that it is a virtual certainty. It) The duty requires
defense counsel to give clear, accurate advice where the deportation
consequence is clear. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. at 1482-3. The standard
set forth in Strickland applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims
based on an allegation of deficient advice under Padilla. Id. at 1482. The
standard involves a two-part inquiry: first, whether the defendant has
demonstrated that his counsel tendered deficient performance that fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness; and second, whether there
is a reasonable possibility that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Yokovac, 145 Idaho at 444.
The INA defines various offenses as an " aggravated felony" and
mandates that a Lawful Permanent Resident who is convicted of an
"aggravated felony" be deported. 8 U.s.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). In addition,
a Lawful Permanent Resident convicted of an aggravated felony is
rendered ineligible for any discretionary relief from removal, and is subject
20

to mandatory detention by immigration authorities. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3); 8
U.s.C. § 1226(c). The offense of "sexual abuse of a minor" appears third on
the list of offenses that are aggravated felonies. 8 U.s.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A).
The Idaho offense of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under Sixteen is clearly
an aggravated felony.
Recognizing that immigration law is a complex body of law, the U.s.
Supreme Court explained that the level of clarity with which a defense
attorney must advise the non-citizen defendant is directly related to the
clarity of the immigration consequences. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1473. Like Mr.
Popoca, Mr. Padilla was a Lawful Permanent Resident. Padilla 130 S.Ct. at
1477. (R., p., 4.) Like Mr. Popoca, Mr. Padilla pleaded guilty to an offense
that explicitly defined the removal consequence of the plea. Padilla, 130
S.Ct. at 1483. (R., p., 5.) The U.s. Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Padilla
that constitutionally competent counsel would have told him that his
conviction subjected him to automatic deportation. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130
S.Ct. at 1478. Because the law is clear that Mr. Popoca was charged with a
"sexual abuse of a minor" offense and the deportation consequence is clear,

Mr. Murdoch had an affirmative obligation to clearly tell Mr. Popoca that if
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he pleaded guilty to the charged offense of Lewd Conduct with a Minor
Under Sixteen, I.C. § 18-1508, he would be deported. Id. at 1483.
Mr. Murdoch told Mr. Popoca different things about the effect that a
conviction for the charged offense would have on his immigration status.
On direct examination, Mr. Murdoch was questioned about what he told
Mr. Popoca regarding how a conviction for the charged offense would
affect Mr. Popoca's immigration status.
Q: Okay. So that would subject him to deportation?
A: Correct
Q: Did you discuss that specific consequence with German?

A: I did. I told him that. There was just one wrinkle in it.
Q: What was that?

A: That was my analysis, based on the research I had done, my
knowledge of immigration law. I'd concluded that. However, the
prosecutor in the case, Mr. Smith, had told me that the immigration
service had contacted him, and they were under the impression that
they could not deport Mr. Popoca for the charge that he had plead guilty
to.
And during my discussions with Mr. Popoca, I remember telling him - I
gave him that information, what the immigration service was saying.
And what I told him was that I thought the immigration service was
wrong that they could deport him for this and most likely would. I just
didn't understand why the immigration service took that - was taking
that position. I thought they \vere mistaken.
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(Tr., p. 37, Ls. 4-23.) (emphasis added).
In his own recitation of his conversation with Mr. Popoca, Mr. Murdoch
said that he told Mr. Popoca that he could be deported. More importantly,
Mr. Murdoch did not tell Mr. Popoca that deportation was not a mere
possibility or likelihood, but that his deportation would be mandated by
law. Pursuant to federal law, Mr. Popoca is required to be ordered
deported for having been convicted of an aggravated felony. 8 U.s.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.s.C. § 1229b(a)(3). By telling Mr. Popoca both that he

might be deported and, alternatively, that he would likely be deported, and
suggesting to him that maybe he wouldn't be deported at all, Mr. Murdoch
failed to clearly provide accurate advice as Padilla requires.
On cross examination, Mr. Murdoch testified that he personally
believed that a conviction for Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under Sixteen
would make a non-citizen deportable.

Q. Sure. So you told Mr. Popoca two things with regard to
immigration. The first being, "I, Manual Murdoch, think that this is
an absolutely deportable offense."
A: Correct.
Q. Okay. "But I'm also sharing with you that immigration doesn't
believe it's a deportable offense"
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A: Exactly.
(Tr., p. 48, Ls. 16-23.) (emphasis added). Mr. Murdoch confirmed that the
offense only made Mr. Popoca subject to potential deportation. He did not
communicate deportation was presumptively automatic.
To comply with Padilla Mr. Murdoch was required to clearly inform
Mr. Popoca that he would be deported if he pleaded guilty to the offense
charged. Padilla requires clear, accurate, unequivocal advice where the
consequence is patently clear. Padilla at 1482-3. The parties do not dispute
this point. (R., pp. 53,65-66,92.) The parties further agree that merely
informing the non-citizen client that he may be deported is insufficient. (R.,
pp. 53,65-66,92.) Pursuant to the testimony above, Mr. Murdoch told Mr.
Popoca that deportation was only a possibility.
At the change of plea hearing, Mr. Murdoch went out of his way to
explain to the trial court exactly what he told Mr. Popoca:
MR. MURDOCH: Your Honor, if I may, there's one thing I'd like to put
on the record. My client will most likely have some immigration
consequences to this. And I've informed him of this, that this could
put his permanent resident status in jeopardy, a plea to this charge,
and he's understood that.
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(Tr., p. II, Ls. 4-11.) (emphasis added). When confronted with the
transcript of the change of plea hearing on cross-examination, Mr.
Murdoch agreed that telling a person that they are deportable is
substantively different than telling a person that they will be deported.
Q. Okay. But that statement [ ... quoted from the change of-plea
hearing above ... ] is not the same statement as saying, "This is an
absolutely deportable offense. There is no relieJfor this. He will be
deported." Would you agree with me that what I just said is different
than what you said, is substantively different than what's in the
transcript?
A: Yes.
(Tr., p. 48., Ls. 16-23.) (emphasis added). Before the trial court accepted Mr.
Popoca's plea, Mr. Murdoch told the Court that he advised Mr. Popoca that
deportation was a mere possibility. (Tr., p. II, Ls. 6-11.) Although Mr.
Murdoch may have held a personal opinion that the offense was an
aggravated felony that mandated Mr. Popoca's deportation, the record is
replete with evidence that he also told Mr. Popoca that he might be
deported.
In denying the petition, the district court reiterated, as fact, that Mr.
Murdoch testified that he told Mr. Popoca that he would be deported. (R.,
p. 94.) The decision also reiterated as fact that Mr. Murdoch told the court
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that he told Mr. Popoca that deportation was a mere possibility. (R., p. 94.)
The district court itself acknowledged that such advice is insufficient. (R.,
p.93.) There are no specific findings that the only advice that Mr. Murdoch
gave Mr. Popoca about the immigration consequences is that deportation
was a certainty. (R., pp. 88-95.) The district court's legal conclusion that
Mr. Murdoch complied with his obligations under Padilla rested upon
factual findings that Mr. Murdoch told Mr. Popoca that he both would be
deported and that he may be deported. This is legal error. Therefore, the
petition should be granted.
III.

Assuming arguendo, that the court finds that Mr. Murdoch
unequivocally told Mr. Popoca that he would be deported as a
result of his plea to the charged offense, the advice was nullified
by Mr. Murdoch's direct and indirect assurances that Mr. Popoca
might not be deported.

Assuming that at some time Mr. Murdoch told Mr. Popoca that he
would be deported, he also suggested he may avoid deportation due to
ICE's purported opinion that the offense did not make Mr. Popoca
deportable. By telling Mr. Popoca that the law required he be deported,
and also telling him that immigration authorities thought that the offense
did not make Mr. Popoca deportable, he effectively communicated to Mr.
Popoca that his risk of deportation was mitigated by the circumstance of
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ICE's opinion. In Padilla the U.s. Supreme Court clearly held that defense
counsel is required to advise the non-citizen defendant of the correct legal
consequence of a entering a plea. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (focusing upon
the immigration statute and the consequences required by law). Mr.
Murdoch allowed a factual circumstance that he believed might mitigate
the risk of deportation to Mr. Popoca to blur the clarity of otherwise correct
legal advice. The result is unclear, unequivocal and unconstitutional
advice.
Even if Mr. Murdoch had provided crystal clear advice, it is of no use if
his words and actions lead Mr. Popoca to believe that his deportation was
not automatic, as he expressed in his verified petition. (R., p. 4-10). As
explained by the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d
1015, 1020 (Wash. 2011), I/[t]he required advice about immigration
consequences would be a useless formality if, in the next breath, counsel
could give the noncitizen defendant the impression that he or she should
disregard what counsel just said about the risk of immigration
consequences."
The obligation that Mr. Murdoch take affirmative steps to
cOlTh~unicate

the clear consequence of Mr. Popoca's guilty "vas all the more
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important given Mr. Murdoch's contrary statements at the change of plea
hearing and his belief at the time that Mr. Popoca was low functioning. 6
(Tr., p. 11, Ls. 6-11; p. 55, Ls. 2-5.) There is no evidence that Mr. Murdoch
took any steps to ensure that Mr. Popoca did not disregard his advice that
that his deportation was presumptively automatic. Even if Mr. Murdoch
reasonably believed that Mr. Popoca may not be deported because of an
error on the part of the immigration authorities, he was still required to
ensure that he continued to provided clear, unequivocal advice to Mr.
Popoca. To find otherwise would gut the purpose of defense counsel's
duty to advise as described in Padilla.
Mr. Murdoch testified that he continued to assert ICE's erroneous
position throughout sentencing. Mr. Murdoch's entire sentencing strategy
depended upon ICE acting on the erroneous opinion.7 Mr. Murdoch

6 The psychosexual that was later produced confirmed that Mr. Popoca had low
intellectual functioning. (Tr., p. 55, Ls. 6-9.)
7 Strategic decisions can be challenged where they are based upon (1) inadequate
preparation, (2) ignorance of relevant law and (3) "other shortcomings" capable of
objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233 (Ct. App. 1994). Here, Mr.
Murdoch's tactical decision was based upon the legal error that ICE controls
prosecution of non-citizens for immigration violations, an unverified hearsay statement
from an adverse party, and adopting a legal position he knew to be false and
representing the same to the court. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 24-25 - p. 8, Ls.1-6.) Petitioner
acknowledges that the district court did not address this issue. However, because the
State argued that Murdoch was not ineffective with regard to the sentencing strategy,
the Petitioner addresses the issue here.
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acknowledged that to obtain probation, Mr. Popoca would have to be
released into the community. (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 12-15.) He further
acknowledged that the fact that he was seeking probation could be
interpreted by Mr. Popoca to mean that there was a chance that he could
actually get probation. (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 4-8.) When he argued for probation
before the trial court, Mr. Murdoch stated that Mr. Popoca's deportation
was uncertain. (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 1-11.)
Consistent with his standard practice, Mr. Murdoch testified that he
would have discussed the sentencing options with Mr. Popoca. (Tr., p. 46,
Ls.l-ll.) Any legitimate discussion about seeking probation must have
included Mr. Murdoch's assurance to Mr. Popoca that probation was
possible, which necessarily included the suggestion that deportation was
not automatic.
Finally, it cannot be said that Mr. Murdoch's belief about ICE's
position was reasonably held. Mr. Murdoch relied upon the recollection of
the prosecuting attorney who had spoken with" the immigration service,"
specifically ICE. (R., p. 94.) (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 24-25 - p. 38, Ls. 1-6; p. 45, Ls.
16-23.) Mr. Murdoch never verified the information himself. Id. In
addition, Mr. Murdoch acknowledged that even if ICE believed that Mr.
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Popoca was not legally required to be deported because of his conviction,
ICE is not the prosecuting body in removal proceedings. (Tr., p. 57, Ls. 711.) Mr. Murdoch was therefore unclear about the role of ICE in removal
proceedings, and the ultimate significance of ICE's legal opinion. (Tr., p.
58, Ls. 1-25 - p. 58, Ls. 16-22; p. 59, Ls. 1-22). Compare 8 C.F.R. § 287.5
(which outlines exercise of power by immigration officers) with 6 US.C.
§ 252(c) (which provides that "[t]he legal advisor ... shall represent the

bureau in all exclusion, deportation, and removal proceedings").
At best, Mr. Murdoch clear's and correct advice became unclear and
incorrect when his words and actions suggested that Mr. Popoca might
avoid deportation. As in Sandoval, the once correct advice was nullified. In
this case, the advice was nullified by Mr. Murdoch's repeated adoption of a
contrary position attributed to ICE, his representations to the trial court,
and his failure to re-advise Mr. Popoca throughout the criminal
proceedings. For these reasons, Mr. Murdoch's representation was
deficient under Strickland.
IV.

Mr. Murdoch's deficient performance materially prejudiced Mr.
Popoca
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To establish prejudice, Petitioner must show a reasonable probability
that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761 (1988);
Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, 451 (Ct. App. 2009). Where, as here, the

petitioner was convicted upon a guilty plea, the petitioner must show a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficiency, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial, or that counsel's
deficient performance affected the outcome of the plea process. Hill v.
Lockhart, 106 S.Ct. 366,370 (1985); Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 82
(2002); McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 851; Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762 (Ct. App.

2006). This requires a showing that a decision not to accept a plea
agreement and plead guilty would have been rational under the
circumstances. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. at 1485. The Strickland
prejudice standard does not require proof by a preponderance of the
evidence, but only by a lesser standard sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome of the plea-bargaining process. Johnson v. Uribe, 682 F.3d
1238 (9th Cir. 2012); Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 443 (Ct. App. 2007).

Mr. Murdoch's representation was deficient to the point of rendering
tvIr. Popoca's guilty plea invalid because the plea did not represent a
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voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action
available to him. If Mr. Popoca had clearly known that his conviction for
the charged offense would cause him to lose his Lawful Permanent
Resident status in the United States and render him permanently ineligible
to return, he would have exercised his right to a jury trial, or perhaps
attempted to further negotiate for an immigration-neutral plea, in order to
avoid deportation. (R., p. 8.)
Even if at the time he changed his plea to guilty, Mr. Popoca was
aware of the "possibility" that he might incur some risk of deportation by
entering such a plea, this still does not show that he would not have gone
to trial rather than plead guilty had he been properly advised that a
conviction would make his deportation virtually certain. See Bonilla, 637
F.3d at 984. Rejecting the guilty plea and electing to go to trial would have
been a rational course of action under the circumstances facing Mr. Popoca
because even if he had received the relatively minor punishment of
prohltion that Mr. Murdoch had been fruitless in pursuing, he would still
have faced the more severe punishment of permanent exile from the
country he has resided in since the age of ten. (R. 4.)
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Given the evidence available in the transcript and the record, there is
every reason to believe that Mr. Popoca would have taken an alternative
course of action if he had been accurately informed of the immigration
consequences of entering a guilty plea. Mr. Popoca stated in the Petition
that he would have exercised his right to a jury trial, or perhaps attempted
to further negotiate for an immigration-neutral plea, in order to avoid
deportation. (R., p. 8.) That statement is entitled to the presumption of
truth. King v. State, 114 Idaho 442 (Ct. App. 1988). Given that Mr. Popoca
has already been banished from the United States for the rest of his life, it is
fair to assume that he would have taken his case to trial in order to avoid
deportation. Such a decision would have been "rational" under the
circumstances. These factors militate in favor of the conclusion that
pursuing an alternative course of action - such as proceeding to trial- was
reasonably probable under the circumstances.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Popoca respectfully requests that
this Court vacate the district court's order dismissing his petition for postconviction relief and remand this case for further proceedings.
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DATED this 4th day of October, 2013 8.
<../

Maria E. Andrade
Attorney for Petitioner

8

On October 3,2013, Andrade Legal was orally granted a 24-hour extension to file this brie£
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